Published November 17, 2026. Statutory text quoted from the 2026 Florida Statutes; case language quoted from the published opinions.
Resisting an officer without violence is the charge that gets added. A traffic stop on I-95, a noise call at an apartment complex in Davie, a trespass warning at a gas station on 441: whatever the original reason for the encounter, if the person walked away, pulled an arm back, refused to sit down or kept asking why, section 843.02 is likely on the arrest form. It is a misdemeanor, but it is the one that survives when everything else is dropped, and it carries a jail exposure of a year. This article quotes the statute and the controlling cases and explains the one question that decides most of these cases: was the officer acting lawfully at the moment of the alleged resistance?
The Short Version
- Section 843.02 makes it a first-degree misdemeanor to “resist, obstruct, or oppose” an officer “in the lawful execution of any legal duty, without offering or doing violence.” Maximum penalty: one year in jail and a $1,000 fine.
- The Florida Supreme Court requires the state to prove two things: the officer was engaged in the lawful execution of a legal duty, and the defendant’s words or conduct obstructed it. (C.E.L. v. State, 2009.)
- If the officer had no lawful basis to detain the person at the moment of the resistance, the charge fails. Running from an officer who lacked reasonable suspicion is not a crime. Florida appellate courts reverse these convictions regularly.
- Resisting with violence under section 843.01 is a third-degree felony. Section 776.051 removes any claim of self-defense against an officer acting in good faith, even if the arrest is later found unlawful.
- Words alone rarely qualify, but can when they are more than protest, such as giving a false name during a lawful detention or warning a suspect to flee.
- Every case is different. A result in one case does not predict the result in another.
In this article
- What Section 843.02 Says
- The Two Elements the State Must Prove
- “Lawful Execution of a Legal Duty”
- Running Away: When Flight Is and Is Not Resisting
- Words, Refusals and Passive Conduct
- Resisting With Violence and the Self-Defense Bar
- Penalties and Collateral Effects
- Where a Defense Begins
- Questions and Answers
What Section 843.02 Says
“Whoever shall resist, obstruct, or oppose any officer as defined in s. 943.10(1), (2), (3), (6), (7), (8), or (9); member of the Florida Commission on Offender Review or any administrative aide or supervisor employed by the commission; county probation officer; parole and probation supervisor; personnel or representative of the Department of Law Enforcement; or other person legally authorized to execute process in the execution of legal process or in the lawful execution of any legal duty, without offering or doing violence to the person of the officer, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083.”
Notice what is not in the statute. There is no requirement of an arrest. The Florida Supreme Court has said so directly: “a violation of section 843.02 is not limited to resisting arrest, but rather expansively criminalizes resistance of an officer who is in the performance of a lawful duty without violence.” (C.E.L. v. State, 24 So. 3d 1181 (Fla. 2009).) A lawful traffic stop, a lawful investigative detention, a lawful entry to serve a warrant: obstructing any of them is enough. Officers and prosecutors still call the charge “resisting arrest,” and the booking sheet often says so, but the legal question is wider than whether an arrest was underway.
Notice also the word “lawful.” It appears in the statute itself, and it is where most of these cases are won or lost.
The Two Elements the State Must Prove
The Florida Supreme Court set out the elements in C.E.L.:
“In other words, to support a conviction for obstruction without violence, the State must prove: (1) the officer was engaged in the lawful execution of a legal duty; and (2) the defendant’s action, by his words, conduct, or a combination thereof, constituted obstruction or resistance of that lawful duty.”
The Court also explained how a judge is supposed to analyze the first element: “To determine whether the State established the first element, whether the officer was engaged in a lawfully executed legal duty, the court must first look to the legal standard that governs his or her actions.” And then: “After examining the applicable legal standard, the next inquiry is whether the officer complied with that legal standard at the point where the act of resistance occurred.”
That two-step test is the whole defense framework. What was the officer doing (a consensual encounter, an investigative stop, an arrest, a search)? What legal standard applies to that activity (nothing, reasonable suspicion, probable cause, a warrant)? Did the officer meet that standard at the exact moment the person allegedly resisted?
“Lawful Execution of a Legal Duty”
Most resisting cases in South Florida arise from street or roadside detentions, so the governing standard is usually Florida’s Stop and Frisk Law. It permits a temporary detention only under defined circumstances:
“Whenever any law enforcement officer of this state encounters any person under circumstances which reasonably indicate that such person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a violation of the criminal laws of this state or the criminal ordinances of any municipality or county, the officer may temporarily detain such person for the purpose of ascertaining the identity of the person temporarily detained and the circumstances surrounding the person’s presence abroad which led the officer to believe that the person had committed, was committing, or was about to commit a criminal offense.”
“No person shall be temporarily detained under the provisions of subsection (2) longer than is reasonably necessary to effect the purposes of that subsection.”
The Second District Court of Appeal summarized the rule the state has to meet: “To establish the lawfulness of a Terry stop, ‘it is necessary for the State to prove that the officer had a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity that would support the detention.'” And the timing matters: whether the suspicion was reasonable “is determined by the totality of the circumstances that existed at the time of the investigatory stop and is based solely on facts known to the officer before the stop.” (B.M. v. State, 212 So. 3d 526 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017), quoting C.E.L.)
What this means in a Broward County courtroom: if the officer’s report says the person “matched the description” but the testimony cannot establish what description the officer had before giving the order to stop, the state has a problem. In B.M., the court reversed because “the only information she knew was the time of the robbery and the suspect’s known direction of travel. This was not enough for the detective to form a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot before she ordered B.M. to stop.”
The flip side: when the officer can articulate specific facts, courts uphold the stop and the resisting charge with it. In T.I.J. v. State (Fla. 3d DCA 2024), the Third District affirmed because “the totality of the circumstances, applied as an objective standard and measured in light of the officer’s training and experience, provided articulable suspicion of criminal activity,” which made the detective’s order to stop a lawful execution of a legal duty. (T.I.J. v. State, No. 3D2023-1268 (Fla. 3d DCA Nov. 6, 2024).) The difference between B.M. and T.I.J. is not the law. It is what the officer could say on the stand about what he or she knew before the command.
Running Away: When Flight Is and Is Not Resisting
This is the most litigated fact pattern in section 843.02 cases, and the Florida Supreme Court addressed it squarely in C.E.L. The baseline rule favors the defendant: “as a general rule, flight, standing alone, is insufficient to form the basis of a resisting without violence charge.” The Court anchored that in the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Florida v. Royer, which it described this way: “when an officer, without reasonable suspicion or probable cause, approaches an individual, the individual has a right to ignore the police and go about his business.” And it quoted the Royer line that “any ‘refusal to cooperate, without more, does not furnish the minimal level of objective justification needed for a detention or seizure.'”
The exception comes from Illinois v. Wardlow. As the Florida Supreme Court put it: “In Wardlow, the Supreme Court held that an individual’s unprovoked, ‘headlong’ flight from the police in a high-crime area can create sufficient reasonable suspicion to warrant an investigative Terry stop.” Applying that, the Court held that C.E.L.’s “continued flight in defiance of the officers’ lawful command constituted the offense of resisting an officer without violence under section 843.02.” The sequence was: unprovoked flight in a high-crime area created reasonable suspicion; the officers then gave a lawful command to stop; continuing to run after that command was the resistance.
Two sentences from C.E.L. define the limits of that holding and are the ones to know:
“We acknowledge that when flight is the act of resistance, an individual who flees must know of the officer’s intent to detain him, and the officer must be justified in making the stop at the point when the act of resistance occurs.”
“Although the mere act of running from the police was not an offense under section 843.02, once a lawful command to stop had been issued by an officer, knowing defiance of that command was such an offense.”
Justice Pariente’s concurrence listed the three questions a defendant can still litigate even after C.E.L.: “First, Wardlow does not establish a per se rule regarding the existence of reasonable suspicion; the existence of reasonable suspicion is judged by a totality of circumstances. Second, an individual prosecuted under section 843.02 can challenge whether his or her flight from police was ‘unprovoked’ and ‘headlong.’ Lastly, that individual can challenge whether the area of his or her alleged violation was actually within a ‘high-crime area.'”
Those three questions are where flight cases are actually fought in Broward and Miami-Dade. “High-crime area” is not established by an officer saying the words; courts have looked for testimony about the specific location and the specific kind of crime. “Unprovoked” matters when officers approached aggressively, drew weapons, or ran at the person first. And flight is not “headlong” when someone walks away, turns a corner, or goes inside a home. The Second District applied this in B.M., noting that “Unprovoked flight from attempted detention in a ‘suspected crime area’ is different from unprovoked flight in a ‘high crime area,’ the latter of which often forms the basis for reasonable suspicion.”
Words, Refusals and Passive Conduct
The statute reaches “words, conduct, or a combination thereof,” in the Supreme Court’s phrasing, but Florida courts have long been reluctant to let protest alone support the charge. Arguing with an officer, asking why you are being stopped, declining to answer questions during a consensual encounter, or filming from a distance are not resisting. Cases where words have supported the charge generally involve something that actually impedes a lawful duty: giving a false name during a lawful detention, shouting a warning that lets a suspect escape, or repeatedly refusing a lawful order that the officer needs obeyed to do the job (stepping out of a car during a valid stop, for example).
Physical but non-violent conduct is the more common basis: pulling an arm away during a lawful handcuffing, going limp, bracing against the patrol car door, walking away from a lawful detention. Each of these is resisting only if the underlying detention or arrest was lawful at that moment, which brings every case back to the first element.
Resisting With Violence and the Self-Defense Bar
The felony version of the charge adds one element: violence to the officer.
“Whoever knowingly and willfully resists, obstructs, or opposes any officer as defined in s. 943.10(1), (2), (3), (6), (7), (8), or (9) … or other person legally authorized to execute process in the execution of legal process or engaged in the performance of his or her official duties as described in s. 943.10, by offering or doing violence to the person of such officer or legally authorized person, commits a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.”
— section 843.01(1), Florida Statutes (2026) (list of covered officers abridged)
“Offering” violence is enough, so a swing that misses or a threatening lunge can be charged as the felony. A separate statute removes the defense most people assume they have:
“A person is not justified in the use or threatened use of force to resist any arrest or detention by a law enforcement officer, or to resist a law enforcement officer who is engaged in the performance of his or her official duties as described in s. 943.10(1), if the law enforcement officer was acting in good faith and he or she is known, or reasonably appears, to be a law enforcement officer. As used in this section, the term ‘acting in good faith’ means to make sincere and reasonable efforts to comply with legal requirements, even if the arrest, detention, or other act is later found to have been unlawful.”
Read the two sections together and the asymmetry is clear. For the misdemeanor, an unlawful detention is a complete defense because the state cannot prove the “lawful execution” element. For the felony, an unlawful arrest does not justify force so long as the officer was acting in good faith. The practical advice follows from the law: never use force, but understand that walking away from an officer who had no basis to stop you is not a crime, and the place to establish that is in court, not on the sidewalk.
Penalties and Collateral Effects
| Charge | Degree | Maximum jail or prison | Maximum fine |
|---|---|---|---|
| Resisting officer without violence, s. 843.02 | First-degree misdemeanor | 1 year county jail | $1,000 |
| Resisting officer with violence, s. 843.01 | Third-degree felony | 5 years state prison | $5,000 |
Maximums are set by sections 775.082 and 775.083. First-time resisting without violence charges are often resolved with probation, a diversion program or a withhold of adjudication, but the conviction itself is the lasting problem: it reads as a crime against law enforcement on every background check, and it is the kind of prior that changes how a prosecutor evaluates the next case. For non-citizens, professional licensees and anyone with a pending case elsewhere, a plea to section 843.02 should never be treated as a formality.
Where a Defense Begins
Reconstruct the moment. The legal question is what the officer knew and was doing at the instant of the alleged resistance, not what was discovered afterward. Body-worn camera footage, dispatch audio and the CAD timeline frequently show that the command to stop came before any articulable basis existed, or that the “resistance” was a reaction to being grabbed without warning.
Identify the duty and the standard. A consensual encounter requires nothing, and a person may walk away from it. An investigative detention requires reasonable suspicion under section 901.151. An arrest requires probable cause. A search of a home requires a warrant or an exception. The state has to prove the officer satisfied the correct standard.
Test the “high-crime area.” Where flight is the alleged resistance, the state usually relies on Wardlow. The officer’s conclusory label is not enough; the defense is entitled to probe what crimes, how recently, and whether the officer’s own experience supports the characterization.
Separate protest from obstruction. Loud, rude or persistent questioning of an officer is not a crime. The state must show conduct that actually obstructed a lawful duty.
Look at what was dropped. When the original charge is dismissed because the stop was bad, the resisting charge usually falls with it, because it depends on the same lawfulness. A prosecutor who is offering to drop everything but the resisting count is often conceding more than the offer suggests.
What to Do After an Arrest
Write down everything you remember about the first sixty seconds of the encounter: who said what, in what order, whether you were told you were being detained, and whether you were touched before or after you moved. Note the names of anyone who recorded it. Do not post about the incident. If you were released with a notice to appear, the court date on it is real and missing it produces a warrant. Request body-camera video early; retention periods for routine footage are short.
Questions and Answers
Is resisting an officer without violence a felony in Florida?
No. Under section 843.02 it is a first-degree misdemeanor, punishable by up to one year in jail and a $1,000 fine. Resisting with violence under section 843.01 is a third-degree felony punishable by up to five years in prison.
Can I be charged with resisting if I was never under arrest?
Yes. The Florida Supreme Court has held that section 843.02 “is not limited to resisting arrest” and covers obstruction of an officer performing any lawful duty, including a lawful investigative stop or traffic stop.
Is running from the police a crime in Florida?
Not by itself. The Florida Supreme Court said in C.E.L. v. State that “flight, standing alone, is insufficient to form the basis of a resisting without violence charge.” Flight becomes resisting when the officer already had a lawful basis to detain the person, the person knew the officer intended to detain them, and they kept running after a lawful command to stop. Unprovoked, headlong flight in a high-crime area can itself supply reasonable suspicion under Illinois v. Wardlow.
What if the stop or arrest was illegal?
For the misdemeanor, an unlawful detention is a defense, because the state must prove the officer was engaged in the “lawful execution of a legal duty.” For the felony of resisting with violence, section 776.051 provides that a person is not justified in using force against an officer acting in good faith, even if the arrest is later found unlawful.
Is arguing with an officer resisting?
Generally no. Words alone rarely support the charge unless they actually obstruct a lawful duty, such as giving a false name during a lawful detention or warning a suspect to flee.
Can a resisting without violence charge be dropped?
Charges can be dismissed, reduced or resolved through diversion depending on the facts and the person’s history. When the underlying stop lacked reasonable suspicion, Florida appellate courts have reversed resisting convictions, as in B.M. v. State (2017). No outcome can be promised.
Charged With Resisting an Officer in South Florida?
Whether the officer was acting lawfully at the moment you allegedly resisted is the question that decides these cases, and it has to be built from the video and the record. Call Alan S. Bernstein P.A. for a free, confidential consultation about a resisting, obstruction or related charge in Broward, Miami-Dade, Palm Beach, Martin and Hendry counties.
Weekdays 954-925-3111 | Evenings and weekends 954-347-1000
Sources
- Florida Statutes (2026): section 843.02 (resisting officer without violence); section 843.01 (resisting with violence); section 776.051 (no justification for force against officer acting in good faith); section 901.151 (Stop and Frisk Law); section 775.082 and section 775.083 (penalties).
- C.E.L. v. State, 24 So. 3d 1181 (Fla. 2009) (elements; flight; Wardlow), discussing Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000), and Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983).
- B.M. v. State, 212 So. 3d 526 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017) (reversing resisting adjudication for lack of reasonable suspicion).
- T.I.J. v. State, No. 3D2023-1268 (Fla. 3d DCA Nov. 6, 2024) (affirming where officer articulated specific facts).
- Related reading on this site: Written Threats Charges Against Florida Students; How bond and charging decisions work in a Florida felony case.
This article is general information about Florida law as of November 17, 2026. Quoted statutory language is from the 2026 Florida Statutes as published by the Florida Senate; quoted case language is from the published opinions. It is not legal advice, and reading it does not create an attorney-client relationship. Every person charged with a crime is presumed innocent unless and until proven guilty. Every case is different. A result in one case does not predict the result in another.